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ABSTRACT
Objective To examine whether the introduction of
paymentbyresults(afixedtariffcasemixbasedpayment
system) was associated with changes in key outcome
variables measuring volume, cost, and quality of care
between 2003/4 and 2005/6.
Setting Acute care hospitals in England.
Design Difference-in-differences analysis (using a control
group created from trusts in England and providers in
Scotland not implementing payment by results in the
relevant years); retrospective analysis of patient level
secondary data with fixed effects models.
Data sources English hospital episode statistics and
Scottish morbidity records for 2002/3 to 2005/6.
Main outcome measures Changes in length of stay and
proportionofdaycaseadmissionsasaproxyforunitcost;
growth in number of spells to measure increases in
output;andchangesinin-hospitalmortality,30daypost-
surgical mortality, and emergency readmission after
treatment for hip fracture as measures of impact on
quality of care.
Results Length of stay fell more quickly and the
proportion of day cases increased more quickly where
payment by results was implemented, suggesting a
reduction in the unit costs of care associated with
payment by results. Some evidence of an association
between the introduction of payment by results and
growth in acute hospital activity was found. Little
measurable change occurred in the quality of care
indicators used in this study that can be attributed to the
introduction of payment by results.
Conclusion Reductions in unit costs may have been
achieved without detrimental impact on the quality of
care, at least in as far as these are measured by the proxy
variables used in this study.
INTRODUCTION
In April 2002 the Department of Health in England
outlined plans to introduce a new system of financing
hospitals, called “payment by results.”
1 The system
markedafundamentalchangeinthewayinwhichhos-
pitals in England were paid for the services they pro-
vide. In common with many other healthcare systems,
paymentbyresultsusesafixedpricesystemthatmakes
a direct link between a hospital’s income and the
number and case mix of patients treated.
2 Payment
by results was motivated by policy objectives to
increase efficiency, volume of activity, and quality of
care in EnglishNHShospitals.This paperpresentsthe
findings of the first extensive quantitative empirical
analysis of the effects of the policy in its first years of
implementation.
Under payment by results, prices (or tariffs) for hos-
pital care are defined in terms of healthcare resource
group (HRG) spells of stay in hospital. A spell of activ-
ityisahospitalstayfromadmissiontodischargeandis
a measure of the hospital’s output. An HRG code is
assigned to each spell of activity.
The tariff system has various characteristics that
shape the incentives of the system. The payment the
hospital receives for providing an HRG spell is deter-
mined by whether that spell is elective and reflects the
difference in costs associated with elective and non-
elective patients.
3 A single tariff exists to reimburse
trustsforeachHRGfordaycaseandinpatientelective
care.
1 The key document introducing the payment by
results policy was Reforming NHS Financial Flows.
1 It
identified three main reasons for introducing a stan-
dard price tariff: to “enable PCT [primary care trust]
commissioners to focus on the quality and volume of
servicesprovided;”to“incentiviseNHSTruststoman-
age costs efficiently;” and to “create greater transpar-
ency and planning certainty in the system.” These
objectives suggest linkages between the adoption of
payment by results, change in the behaviour of deci-
sion makers, and subsequent changes in the perfor-
mance of the NHS hospital system in England.
Beforepaymentbyresults,severaldifferentpurchas-
ingarrangementswereusedintheEnglishNHS.These
were variously called block contracts, sophisticated
block contracts, cost and volume contracts, and cost
percasecontracts.
4Thefirsttwoofthesearrangements
accounted for most of hospitals’ income. Relative to
the financing arrangements in place before its adop-
tion, payment by results removes the option for hospi-
talstousetheirowncostcircumstancestonegotiatefor
higher payment. This feature of fixed price payment
systems for health care gives rise to increased incen-
tivestocontrolcosts.
5Anysurplusearnedbyahospital
because it reduces its unit costs can be retained by the
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cretion.
However, fixed price payment systems may com-
promise quality of care.
5 Providers can act to reduce
costs in various ways: by increasing the efficiency
with which they use resources to provide care, by
selecting patients who need less resource intensive
care,or by reducingthe level ofresourcesin the provi-
sion of care, which has a lowering effect on the quality
ofthepatients’care.Althoughtheintentionofthepay-
mentbyresultspolicyisthatNHStrustswillrespondto
the fixed price with increases in efficiency, providing
an incentive to reduce unit costs may compromise the
quality of care provided.
Payment by results makes an explicit link between
the number of patients treated and the payment to a
hospital, whereas the predominant arrangements that
itreplacesleftthislinkpoorlydefined.Thelogicofthis
seemsclear:makinganexplicitpaymentforadditional
treatments provides incentives to provide more of
those treatments. However, this will be the case only
ifthepaymentforatreatmentishigherthanthecostsof
providing the treatment, such that a surplus can be
made and used for other purposes. In a complex
healthcaresetting,thissurplus(ordeficit)pertreatment
will vary across HRGs and also between trusts with
different cost structures, so the incentive to increase
output will vary across HRGs and between trusts.
Our objective was to examine whether changes in
key outcome variables measuring the volume, cost,
and quality of care during 2004/5 and 2005/6 were
associated with tariff funding introduced for NHS hos-
pitals in England under the payment by results policy.
METHODS
Study design
When examining the impact of an intervention or
changeinpolicy,thechallengeistodeterminewhether
the observed changes over time are attributable to the
intervention. A valid method of achieving this is by
comparing the outcomes of the group subject to the
intervention (the treatment group) with a group not
subject to the intervention (the control group). For
measuring the effect of healthcare interventions, this
evaluation problem is most commonly solved by the
use of an experiment in the form of a trial. However,
such experiments, randomised or not, are rare in the
field of health policy, and opportunities in the form of
quasi-experiments or natural experiments have to be
exploited.
We therefore constructed a quasi-experiment using
various naturally occurring control groups. The figure
shows the introduction of the tariff system under pay-
mentbyresultsin2003/4to2005/6.Thepink(darker)
boxes indicate where the tariff is being applied in part:
itwasfirstappliedtomarginalchangesinoutputfor15
HRGsin2003/4andextendedtoafurther33HRGsin
2004/5.
13Theblue(medium)boxesindicatewherethe
tariff is being applied to all the spells of care. For a
subset of NHS trusts—foundation trusts (box) and
three early implementing non-foundation trusts—pay-
mentbyresultswasappliedtomostinpatient,daycase,
and outpatient output activity in 2004/5. For the
remaining non-foundation trusts, it was applied to
most elective admissions in 2005/6.
67 The grey
(lighter) boxes indicate where the tariff is not being
used.Throughouttheperiod2003/4to2005/6thetar-
iff system was not adopted in Scotland, and for most
trusts in England it was not adopted extensively until
2005/6. This phased and partial introduction of pay-
ment by results providesa seriesof treatment and con-
trol groups.
Ideally, the control group will be the same as the
interventiongroupineverythingotherthanthechange
inpolicy.Inpractice,differencesusuallyexistbetween
thetwogroupsinobservedandunobservedcharacter-
istics. However, a less onerous assumption is that, in
the absence of the policy intervention, the unobserved
differencesbetweenthetwogroupswouldbethesame
over time. Difference-in-differences analysis is a com-
monly used empirical technique in the evaluation of
impacts of policy, which uses this assumption and is
similar to a controlled before and after study but in a
multivariate context.
89We used this technique to esti-
mateaveragechangesinkeyvariablesinthetreatment
andcontrolgroupsbeforeandaftertheintroductionof
payment by results and hence to estimate the average
effects of payment by results. The absolute differences
betweenthepolicygroupandthecontrolgrouparenot
important. It is the difference in differences, or the dif-
ferences in the changes over time, that are subject to
analysis. This means that our statistical methods strip
out any potentially unobserved confounding differ-
ences in the control and treatment groups that are
fixed over time, apart from any that are simultaneous
withthe implementationofpaymentbyresultsinEng-
land. The analysis also controls for differences at base-
line.
Non-foundation trusts and foundation trusts were
subject to virtually all the same changes in policy
2003/04
Elective admissions—15 HRGs
Elective admissions—33 HRGs
All other elective admissions
Non-elective admissions
All trusts
2004/05 2005/06
NFTs NFTs FTs FTs
Stages of implementation of payment by results, 2003/4 to
2005/6. FT=foundation trust; HRG=healthcare resource group;
NFT=non-foundation trust
Foundation trusts
Foundation trusts are a type of NHS trust. They were
created to give high performing trusts greater autonomy
from control by central government. The first foundation
trusts were established in April 2004; 29 existed by the
end of 2004/5 and 34 by the end of 2005/6.
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tanttoourstudy.Thefirstisthedifferenceinthetiming
of the introduction of payment by results, which we
exploit in our study design. The second is that trusts
gain greater financial freedoms on achieving founda-
tion trust status. This may mean that they are better
placed to respond to the financial incentives of pay-
mentbyresultsorhaveagreatermotivationtorespond
than the non-foundation trusts. If this is the case, we
may overestimate the effects of payment by results
when measuring its effects on key outcomes for foun-
dation trusts in 2004/5. However, in order to achieve
foundation trust status, non-foundation trusts have
incentives other than payment by results to improve
their performance. If this occurred for the control
group in 2004/5, we may have underestimated the
average effect of payment by results on the foundation
trusts. Research elsewhere suggests that the financial
performance of foundation trusts during the period of
early achievement of this status was similar to that of
non-foundation trusts.
10
Although differences exist in aspects of the health-
care systems and policies of England and Scotland,
they are broadly comparable. Seen in an international
setting, given the possibilities in design of healthcare
systems,theEnglishandScottishsystemshaveconsid-
erable similarities. They essentially shared the same
financingmechanismsandbroadpolicydevelopments
until the Scotland Act 1998. Both systems are predo-
minantlyfundedthroughgeneraltaxationandprovide
servicesfreeatthepointofconsumption,andtheyboth
use family doctors as gatekeepers to secondary care
services. They also have the same nationally agreed
(UK) contracts for consultants, nurses, and general
practitioners. The NHS in Scotland provides a struc-
ture similar to the English NHS, and importantly one
that has been relatively stable in its financing of hospi-
tals at the time of the implementation of payment by
results. As a result, we consider that the NHS in Scot-
land provides a useful control in our analysis.
We used differences between the phasing in of pay-
ment by results by foundation trusts, non-foundation
trusts, and Scotland to estimate the effects of the intro-
duction of the policy. For each of the outcome mea-
sures used in the study, we made three main
comparisons: between foundation trusts (treatment
group)andnon-foundationtrusts(control)forchanges
from 2003/4 to 2004/5, using the difference that pay-
mentby resultswasimplementedforfoundationtrusts
in 2004/5; between foundation trusts (treatment
group) and providersin Scotland (control) for changes
from2003/4to2004/5,usingthe samedifference;and
between non-foundation trusts (treatment group) and
providersinScotland(control)forchangesfrom2004/
5 to 2005/6, using the difference that payment by
resultswasfirstimplementedfornon-foundationtrusts
in 2005/6. We made a fourth comparison to analyse
changes in foundation trusts over the full first two
years of implementation of payment by results:
between foundation trusts (treatment group) and
providers in Scotland (control) for changes from
2003/4 to 2005/6.
Data sources
We used data from the hospital episode statistics for
2002/3 to 2005/6 for England and from the Scottish
morbidityrecords(SMR01andSMR02)forScotland.
Table 1showssummarystatistics.Tomatchtheunitof
output to the unit of reimbursement, we converted the
data from finished consultant episode level to spell
level data (NHS Information Authority, Episodes to
Spells Converter, version 3.1). A finished consultant
episoderepresentsthecompletionofapatient’speriod
of care under a consultant, after which the patient is
either discharged or transferred to another consultant.
A spell is the period of care in hospital from admission
to discharge. It can consist of a single or multiple fin-
ished consultant episode(s). We used spells of activity
in all subsequent analysis. To construct a model in
which the “before” period did not include tariffed
spells, we excluded spells within the list of 48 HRGs
specified by the Department of Health for special
application of the tariff in 2003/4 and 2004/5.
13The
sample sizes shown in the results tables refer to the
number of spells. They are large and vary with each
model. The English data represent 248 acute care
trusts, and the Scottish data come from 49 hospitals.
Thirty four of the English trusts gained foundation sta-
tus or were early implementers of payment by results
during the period of analysis.
The rate of coding errors differed between the Scot-
tish and English datasets. Unclassified spells or U
codes in HRG 3.5 are generated mostly because of
missing information on the required fields such as
age, sex, date of admission, date of discharge, and
length of stay. The hospital episode statistics data con-
tained 2.68% of U codes in 2002/3, 2.93% in 2003/4,
2.40% in 2004/5, and 1.16% in 2005/6; the Scottish
morbidity records data contained 1.34%, 1.37%,
1.36%, and 1.36% of U codes for the same years.
We used log length of stay (to give a close to normal
distribution of the data) and day cases as a proportion
ofelectiveadmissionsasourtwomainmeasuresofunit
costs or efficiency for hospital admissions. For quality
of care, we followed convention and used in-hospital
mortality, 30 day post-surgical mortality, and emer-
gency readmission after treatment for hip fracture.
Econometric methods
We used fixed effects to control for differences
between the characteristics of HRGs and trusts that
wereunobservedanddidnotchangeovertime.Exam-
ples of such trust level characteristics are management
culture, teaching status, and characteristics of the local
population. HRG level unobserved factors include
technology, specialty specific factors, patients’ demo-
graphics, and case mix within the HRG.
Other unobserved factors are likely to vary both
withintrustsandwithinHRGs.Inaddition,sometrusts
may be more efficient at providing particular HRGs
and achieve better outcomes, and some HRGs will be
RESEARCH
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ticular types of trust both before and after the policy
change. We therefore interacted the two variables to
create fixed effects for each combination of HRG and
trust. A total of 81820 fixed effects exist. Inclusion of
these effects ensured that we modelled changes in effi-
ciency and quality associated with payment by results.
Thus, we avoid the selection bias associated with attri-
bution to payment by results of differences between
trusts that determined whether they received founda-
tionstatus.Wealsocontrolledforthecharacteristicsof
HRGsthatdeterminedwhethertheyweredeemedsui-
table for inclusion in payment by results.
For the analysis of length of stay, the data contain
many zeros and the distribution of length of stay is
skewed to the right. Because of this, we used a two
part model and a log transformation of the dependent
variable.
11
RESULTS
Impact on unit costs
The results for proxies of unit costs were consistent
across most of the difference-in-differences analyses:
they suggest that unit costs fell more quickly where
payment by results was implemented (table 2). In all
but one of the difference-in-differences comparisons
used, foundation trusts and non-foundation trusts
responded in the expected way to the incentives asso-
ciated with payment by results. The first column in
table 2 identifies the group of trusts to which the tariff
is being applied; the second column is the control
group used to estimate the difference in differences.
The third column shows the year of analysis—for
example, 2004/5 indicates the change in length of
stay in 2004/5. The fourth and sixth columns contain
the coefficients from the regression analysis. These
show the change between the treatment group and
the control group.
Length of stay generally fell more quickly where
payment by results was implemented. In 2004/5 the
average length of stay in foundation trusts fell by 0.08
of a day more than it did in Scotland. Expressed in
whole days, this equates to eight inpatient days saved
for every 100 inpatient admissions. For non-founda-
tion trusts that implemented payment by results in
2005/6 the difference was in the same direction, indi-
cating a faster reduction in average length of stay in
non-foundation trusts than in Scotland by 0.03 days
or a saving of three days per 100 admissions.
The proportion of elective care provided as day
cases increased more quickly where payment by
results was implemented. This change was seen for
both foundation trusts and non-foundation trusts. In
2004/5 day cases as a proportion of elective care
grew by 0.4 percentage points more in foundation
trusts than in other providers, and in 2005/6 the pro-
portion of elective care provided as day cases grew by
0.8 percentage points more in non-foundation trusts
than in Scotland.
One difference-in-differences analysis using non-
foundation trusts as the control for foundation trusts
in2004/5didnotsupportexpectations.Thenon-foun-
dation trusts, which were not subject to tariff, reduced
length of stay more quickly than did the foundation
trusts.
Impact on volume of spells
Using Scotland as the control group, we found that
both foundation trusts and non-foundation trusts
experienced a growth in volume associated with pay-
ment by results. The number of foundation trusts’
spells grew by 1.33 percentage points more than for
Table 1 |Summary statistics of hospital episode statistics and Scottish morbidity data
2001/2 2002/3 2003/4 2004/5 2005/6
Number of spells
Non-foundation trusts 7 629 806 7 526 797 7 820 040 7 958 654 8 347 898
Foundation trusts 1 617 327 1 845 650 1 929 056 1 973 753 2 077 994
Scotland 1 061 903 1 030 201 1 031 844 1 039 950 1 063 328
Length of stay (days)
Non-foundation trusts:
Number 4 802 745 4 704 459 4 946 759 5 060 002 5 243 302
Mean 10.33 8.80 8.16 7.89 7.42
Foundation trusts:
Number 978 306 1 094 740 1 144 208 1 169 162 1 219 550
Mean 8.20 6.74 6.59 6.28 5.98
Scotland:
Number 694 376 685 289 682 111 680 309 687 721
Mean 7.51 7.47 7.51 7.42 7.27
In-hospital mortality
Non-foundation trusts:
Number 7 629 806 7 526 797 7 820 040 7 958 654 8 347 898
Mean 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
Foundation trusts:
Number 1 617 327 1 845 650 1 929 056 1 973 753 2 077 994
Mean 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Scotland:
Number 1 061 903 1 030 201 1 031 844 1 039 950 1 063 328
Mean 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
30 day post-surgical mortality
Non-foundation trusts:
Number 3 240 116 3 256 791 3 337 277 3 352 583 2 960 147
Mean 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Foundation trusts:
Number 734 585 865 652 896 085 901 642 832 153
Mean 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Scotland:
Number 499 288 481 190 481 268 486 319 508 204
Mean 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Emergency readmission after treatment for hip fracture
Non-foundation trusts:
Number 44 419 44 118 43 879 45 231
Mean 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.13
Foundation trusts:
N u m b e r 92 0 5 93 4 0 92 1 1 93 4 4
Mean 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.11
Scotland:
N u m b e r 62 0 7 61 7 9 61 5 0 62 9 9
Mean 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09
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trusts’ spells grew by 2.57 percentage points over and
above growth in Scotland. However, the comparison
of the tariffed response of foundation trusts with the
non-tariffed response of non-foundation trusts, in
2004/5, shows that foundation trusts’ spells did not
increase relative to the non-foundation trusts. This
last result suggests that changes in policies other than
payment byresults thatwe were not ableto controlfor
inouranalysis,suchaswaitingtimetargets,affectedthe
growthinthevolumeofcareinEnglandrelativetothat
in Scotland. Table 3 summarises the difference-in-dif-
ferences results for the growth in volume of elective
and non-elective spells.
Impact on quality of care
We found little evidence of an associationbetween the
introduction of paymentby results and a changein the
quality of care. Table 4 shows the difference-in-
differences results for the three variables we used to
measure quality: in-hospital mortality, 30 day post-
surgical mortality, and emergency readmission after
treatment for hip fracture. The only result with statisti-
cal significance was the difference in the change in
in-hospital mortality for foundation trusts compared
with Scotland. A difference emerged when we looked
at the longer term effects—that is, two years of impact
of payment by results. This provided one piece of
evidence that the quality of care in foundation trusts
increased (represented by a reduction in in-hospital
mortality) in association with the introduction of the
tariff. No results support the proposition that
quality of care has suffered as a result of payment by
results. Most results indicate no associated change in
quality.
DISCUSSION
Using a series of comparisons for each set of variables
and using different controls within a difference-in-
differences framework, we have examined whether,
in response to the introduction of a fixed price tariff
under payment by results, trusts have reduced unit
costs, increased the volume of care, and changed the
qualityofcare.Mostofourtestsonmeanlengthofstay
and the proportion of day case activity in total elective
admissionsare consistentwithareductioninunitcosts
associated with introduction of the tariff. Of the five
tests on the effect of the tariff on the volume of care,
four provided evidence that the tariff was associated
with growth in activity. During their first full year of
payment by results, foundation trusts did not experi-
ence the greater reductions in average length of stay
andhighergrowthexpectedrelativetonon-foundation
trusts. Only when they were compared with Scotland
was a difference apparent. Both foundation trusts and
non-foundation trusts seem to have increased volume
and reduced length of stay relative to Scotland. This
may reflect several pressures. Evidence from inter-
views with NHS managers suggests that other pres-
sures in the form of waiting times targets and cash
limits were driving these changes.
12 The difference
betweentrusts’costsandthetariffmayhaveinfluenced
the response. Foundation trusts by definition are the
more efficient and well managed trusts in England,
with shorter lengths of stay. The tariffs are based on
historical average costs, and foundation trusts may
haveexperiencedlesspressurefromthetarifftoreduce
costs than was the case in other trusts. In addition, the
low absolute length of stay may have made it more
difficultforfoundationtruststoproduceefficiencysav-
ingsinthisarea.However,theseverysamefoundation
trustsshouldthereforehavebeeninabetterpositionto
havebenefitedfromincreasesinthevolumeofpatients
treated, but we did not see this in the data. The results
for the effects on quality of care were generally not
statistically significant and may be taken as evidence
thatpaymentbyresultsdidnothaveanadverseimpact
on the quality of care.
The results showing reductions in length of stay and
increasesintheproportionofdaycaseactivityprovide
Table 2 |Effects of payment by results on measures of unit costs: length of stay (days) and proportion of day cases (change
in percentage points)
Treatment group Control group Years
Length of stay Day case proportion
Change No* Change No*
Foundation trusts Non-foundation trusts 2003/4-2004/5 0.02† 1091 0.4† 8266
Foundation trusts Scotland 2003/4-2004/5 −0.08† 2724 0.4† 2810
Non-foundation trusts‡ Scotland‡ 2004/5-2005/6 −0.03† 1704 0.8† 6842
Foundation trusts Scotland 2003/4-2005/6 −0.18† 1248 1.5† 1178
*Number of observations in 1000s.
†Significant at P<0.01.
‡Elective only.
Table 3 |Effects of payment by results on growth in volume of care (change in percentage
points)
Treatment group Control group Years
Growth in volume
Change No*
Foundation trusts Non-foundation trusts 2003/4-2004/5 −0.25 82 816
Foundation trusts Scotland 2003/4-2004/5 1.33† 20 431
Non-foundation
trusts‡
Scotland‡ 2004/5-2005/6 2.57† 51 249
Foundation trusts Scotland 2003/4-2105/6 4.95† 21 598
*Number of observations in 1000s.
†Significant at P<0.01.
‡Elective only.
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resultspolicyonhospitals’costs.Thedamagingeffects
on the quality of care often anticipated in financing
systemswith fixed prices did not emerge in the results.
Combining these two pieces of evidence points to the
tentative conclusion that reductions in cost have been
attained through increases in efficiency rather through
reductions in quality.
Limitations
We used standard proxies for quality of care in our
analysis: in-hospital mortality, 30 day post-surgical
mortality, and emergency readmissions. Mortality
has been criticised as an insufficiently sensitive mea-
sure of change in the quality of care.
13 However, it is
widely used in the absence of other routine data, such
as quality of life outcomes measures, which may be
more sensitive to changes in the quality of care.
5 In-
hospital mortality specifically is open to criticism as a
means of measuring quality of care in a system that is
also reducing length of stay. Reductions in in-hospital
mortality may reflect patients dying outside hospital
after rapid discharge. However, our (setting indepen-
dent) 30 day mortality figures do not support the
existence of this phenomenon.
We are confident that no change in the quality of
care as measured by the proxies we have used has
occurred. However, dimensions of quality of care
that we have not captured could have been adversely
affected by payment by results.
As described in the data sources section above, the
proportion of unclassified spells has fallen more
quickly in the hospital episode statistics data than in
the Scottish data. U codes do not receive funding
under payment by results, so the trend probably
reflects the incentive to ensure that all activity is
assignedanHRGcode.WedroppedallUcodedspells
from the analysis. This may have slightly inflated the
effect of the tariff on the growth of spells.
Difference-in-differences analysis is a methodo-
logicalframeworkwidelyusedtoevaluatetheeffectsof
policy.
89 We have exploited the natural experiment
that was created by the stepped introduction of the
payment by results policy in England and the absence
of payment by results in Scotland. The method
controls for differences between the two countries
that do not vary over time. Ideal conditions for
applying difference-in-differences analysis require
that in the absence of the policy intervention the aver-
age outcomes for the treatment and control groups
would be parallel over time. Although policy differ-
ences exist between the two countries, provided these
differences are time invariant, the method “nets” these
out. However, if a policy, other than payment by
results, that might influence the outcomes in which
we were interested changed in one country and not
the other, this may bias our results. “Patient choice” is
one such policy, which is expected to complement the
effects of payment by results. However, it was not
implemented until the final quarter of the final year of
data used in our analysis. Therefore, we do not anti-
cipatethatitwillhavesignificantlyaffectedourresults.
Of more concern is the differential in waiting times
introduced in 2004/5. Waiting time targets of the
same level were used in England and Scotland
throughout the period of our study with the exception
ofthesixmonthstargetinEnglandfortheendof2004/
5 compared with nine months in Scotland. However,
the rewards and sanctions associated with meeting or
not meeting waiting time targets have been stronger in
England during this period, and Propper et al found
greater reductions in waiting times corresponding to
theseincentives.
14ThisadditionalincentiveinEngland
to increase the throughput of patients may have had a
confounding effect on the results for the growth in the
volumeofspellsin2004/5andmayexplainthelackof
difference in growth of the tariffed foundation trusts
andthe non-tariffednon-foundationtrustsinthatyear.
The results of this study refer specifically to the
effects of the payment by results policy in its early
years of implementation and may not necessarily be
extrapolated forwards as the tariff continues to be
used in England. The providers’ response may
become more pronounced as the policy matures.
Firstly, as hospitals become more familiar with the
likely effects on their own costs and revenues of
responding to the incentives of payment by results,
theymaybe lesscautiousin theirresponses.Secondly,
ashospital managersand cliniciansbecome more con-
fidentaboutthepermanenceofpaymentbyresultsand
Table 4 |Effects of payment by results on measures of quality of care: rates of in-hospital mortality, 30 day post-surgical
mortality, and emergency readmission after treatment for hip fracture (change in percentage points)
Treatment group Control group Year
In-hospital
mortality 30 day mortality
Hip fracture
emergency
readmissions
Change No* Change No* Change No*
Foundation trusts Non-foundation
trusts
2003/4-2004/5 0.01 19 744 0.01 6 775 −0.68 107
Foundation trusts Scotland 2003/4-2004/5 −0.05 5 090 0.03 2 215 0.73 29
Non-foundation
trusts‡
Scotland‡ 2004/5-2005/6 −0.00 6 840 −0.05 3 823 0.00 102
Foundation trusts Scotland 2003/4-2005/6 −0.28† 21 9 2 −0.00 1 046 −1.20 14
*Number of observations in 1000s.
†Significant at P<0.01.
‡Elective only.
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incentives. Thirdly, our study covers a period when
most hospitals affected by payment by results were
on a transition pathway that partially protected them
from financial losses associated with the tariff. As this
protection reduces, the incentives of payment by
results may be strengthened and the responses chan-
ged accordingly. Clearly, further research is needed
to monitor the changing effects of payment by results
on key outcomes in the English healthcare system.
Key findings in context
An activity based finance system using diagnostic
related groups was first developed in the United States
andusedtopayhospitalsaspartofthepubliclyfunded
Medicare programme in 1983.
15 Since then more than
20 healthcare systems in Europe, Australia, Asia, and
Africa have adopted similar financing mechanisms
based on diagnostic related groups.
16 The dominant
motivation for adopting activity based financing has
been to control total healthcare costs and introduce
incentives to increase efficiency, although some sys-
tems were also targeting waiting times and in turn the
volume of care.
17 Reductions in unit costs, with
reduced length of stay as a proxy, are a commonly
seen effect of the systems, and, on occasion, quite dra-
matic reductions have been seen.
5
Less agreement exists on the effects of financing
based on diagnostic related groups on the quality of
care. A common theme in the literature is the inade-
quacy of using variables from administrative data as
measures of quality. Despite this, and in the absence
ofothermeasures,themainoutcomesusedtomeasure
changesinthe qualityofcarearemortality(beforeand
after discharge) and readmission rates extracted from
suchroutinelycollecteddata.Lesscommonly,surveys
ofpatientshavebeenused.
18EvidencefromtheUnited
States suggesting a negative impact on quality of care
after the introduction of activity based financing has
not been reproduced for European countries adopting
similar systems.
19 However, whether these findings
reflecttheeffectsofthepolicy,thedifferentunderlying
healthcare systems in the United States and European
countries, or the inadequacy of the proxies for quality
remains a debated issue.
Nordic countries adopting activity based financing
(Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland) have gen-
erally done so with the explicit aim of increasing pro-
ductivity and reducing patients’ waiting times for
hospital care.
20 Empirical analysis of the effects of
some of these schemes on output cautiously provides
evidence of a positive relation between diagnostic
related groups pricing and output in Norway,
17
although the effects seem to have been temporary in
Sweden.
21
Some papers have commented on the likely effects
of the introduction of payment by results in
England,
22-24 and a body of empirical analysis is emer-
ging. The empirical based papers have examined the
impact on managementof demand and administrative
costs,
25 transaction costs,
26 “HRG drift,”
27 waiting
times, the process of implementation,
28 and similar
key outcomes to the ones presented in this paper.
29 A
report by the Audit Commission draws on a similar
timeperiodtotheresearchreportedhere,andthefind-
ings mirror those of our evaluation.
29 Our research
provides the first robust empirical analysis that uses
econometrictechniquestocontrolforotherconfound-
ing factors that may be influencing key outcomes.
Implications
Our substantive quantitative analysis of the effects of
payment by results on key outcomes provides evi-
dence of reductions in unit costs of hospital care asso-
ciated with the introduction of payment by results in
England in its early years of implementation. Less
unequivocal evidence shows that payment by results
has stimulated increases in the volume of spells. With
respect to quality of care, the evidence should be trea-
ted with caution because, in common with other
researchers, we were limited by the availability of
proxies for the complexity that is “quality” of health
care. Our results suggest that the reductions in unit
costshavebeenachievedwithoutadetrimentalimpact
onthequalityofcare,atleastinasfarastheseare mea-
sured by our proxy variables.
Taken together, the analyses suggests that payment
by results is capable of achieving, and has in the short
time since its adoption actually achieved, real changes
indeliveryofhealthcareinhospitalsinEngland.Look-
ing forward, our evaluation suggests a potentially rich
set of further research questions. Our approach has of
necessity been a general one; much remains to be
learnt about the impact of payment by results at a
more disaggregate level.
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